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Consciousness

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Jenny
11832.  Sun Dec 05, 2004 11:07 am Reply with quote

<applause for G92>

 
Gray
11850.  Sun Dec 05, 2004 6:52 pm Reply with quote

<joins applause>

I never tire of pointing people towards optical illusions to convince them that even the things they most take for granted are mostly rubbish. The fun thing about blind spots is not that you can't see anythig in them - it's that you don't even know the blind spot is there, so you can't even be careful!

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I do not personally think that a computer would ever be capable of taking a step such as described: to date, all computers have worked on the GIGO principle (garbage in, garbage out). If you gave a computer the option of ignoring its own operating parameters, it would pretty soon crash in a heap of system errors.
Well, you're right if you're thinking about linear step-by-step programming, but there's more than one way to program them.

There are plenty of evolutionary algorithms and neural networks that can generate at-least-as-good programs as human programmers can to solve certain problems. They don't have operational parameters as such, and you can't work out how they work, either. Just like our own brains, in fact...

In my opinion, to attempt to put anything other than a level-of-complexity gap between neural-network computers and human brains is to give in to dualism. We're just made of molecules, so it's only a matter of time before we are able to make something that's at least as convinced of the reality of its own illusions as we are of ours.

Myself, I can't believe it's taking so long to crack dolphin language. Boy do we have some things to check with them. "You too, huh? Well, that's a relief."

 
DELETED
12854.  Tue Jan 04, 2005 1:13 pm Reply with quote

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Flash
12856.  Tue Jan 04, 2005 2:36 pm Reply with quote

Two things:

1) Garrick - what a cracking post! Is there not perhaps, some way in which we can publish it more widely and all of us receive credit and (perhaps) money in return for your efforts?; and

2) Jenny - thank God you're bacK! There's a huge row taking place over on the general board where I'm being flamed by all and sundry and have only Gray to support me. Crack the whip a bit, can you? I've tried to blame it all on you as this seemed the sensible course in your absence, but it's wearing pretty thin.

 
Gray
12865.  Tue Jan 04, 2005 3:15 pm Reply with quote

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Pshaw.
Hmm, you've lost me there...
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Who says any of it's an illusion?
Quite a lot of cognitive neuroscientists. For example, the 2003 Reith Lecture from V.S. Ramachandran (published as 'The Emerging Mind' - a slim volume that can, very usefully, be read in a bookshop coffee-break) explains and illustrates many ways in which we are fooled not only in our perceptions of the world, but also in the very nature of our conscious selves. We're not doing what we think we're doing.

What makes you think we wouldn't be able to understand any of the symbols that dolphins use in their language? They use individual names for each other perfectly satisfactorily, and we 'understand' that concept. Wittgenstein's aphorism is amusing, and notable for its comment on different types of world views, but he knew nothing of the mechanics of linguistics, dying some decades before anything about the linguistic functioning of the brain was discovered.

We certainly wouldn't share most of their concerns, but that's a different matter to 'not understanding them'.

 
DELETED
12972.  Wed Jan 05, 2005 1:27 pm Reply with quote

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Gray
12982.  Wed Jan 05, 2005 3:04 pm Reply with quote

Okay, some misunderstandings here...

By 'Just like our own brains...' I meant that we can no more 'understand' the wiring of a simple neural network (after it's learned a task) than we can 'understand' the neural wiring that makes up a part of the brain. It's the same principle as not being able to understand the way an ant formicary moves by inspecting each of the ants in it. I did not mean to imply that the neural networks we have today are just like the brain, as they are demonstrably not. There are, however, some very simple neural networks that can out-perform brains in many narrow-field areas.

I also never meant to imply that the whole of consciousness was an illusion. It obviously can't be, because the 'What is having the illusion' paradox arises. I did mean to say that lots of things that we perceive are illusory, which can be easily demonstrated by things like optical illusions, phantom limbs, etc. As the brain is studied, it's clear that larger and larger slices of what we perceive are not what's actually working in the cause-and-effect manner we has always assumed.

The whole of colour perception is a classic example. Colours don't exist outside our brains, but it's taken us a while to realise this. The particular combination of light receptors in our eyes makes us think that objects must be 'coloured', but that's merely a comment about the way our brains are wired, not about the actual world. Hence the whole concept of 'colour' is an illusion cast by our brains on our consciousness - it's a way for information to get into our conscious awareness.

Another example is this 'zombie self' that can do things without the need for any conscious input. Driving a car across town while carrying out a complex conversation with a passenger... Why do some parts of the brain's operation require 'consciousness' and some not?

'Self' is clearly a problem, simply because it can't be explained in terms that we already understand, and we have no idea what happens at its edge (sleeping and waking for example). If it could be explained, it would be possible to make something that could announce, clearly and concisely, that it had a self.

Please explain your tea-choking episode. I'm not a mind-reader, as you can probably tell...

 
Gray
18281.  Fri Apr 22, 2005 11:40 pm Reply with quote

Okay, this is extremely amusing. I've just bought Terry Bisson's book Bears Discover Fire on the strength of it...

 
JumpingJack
38158.  Sat Dec 10, 2005 12:59 pm Reply with quote

Magnificent excerpt, Gray.

Magnificent post, Garrick.

Splendid thread altogether. I have coaxed it to the top of the pile.

 
Mr Grue
39500.  Thu Dec 15, 2005 7:23 am Reply with quote

This is the longest shortest thread ever! And just to make matters worse:

Man Can Repeat But He Cannot Understand


There is a particular piece of human arrogance that begins “What sets us apart from the animals is…” and usually covers such a variety of traits such as the ability to dream (except for dogs), the ability to use tools (except for primates and crows), the ability to fashion tools (except for those crows again), and so on1. The point here is that as soon as we stake any claim to exclusivity over a particular aspect of the human experience, some animal comes along and proves us wrong. Perhaps this is in part Nature’s intent, that she listens closely to, say, how we classify animals and just when we’ve got it all down pat, invents a duck billed platypus and a seahorse, just to annoy the scientists and make biology teachers’ lives all the harder. One of the defining features of humanity seemed to remain safely ours, though; the complexities of our language.

True enough, experiments have been made that suggest that animals have some kind of language ability, but with varying degrees of success and varying degrees of validity. The hitherto most promising experiments involved teaching sign language to gorillas, but the dispute over whether the gorillas are entering into conversation with their balder friends or just mimicking them has never been satisfactorily resolved. Less inspiring experiments include the underwater keyboard created for dolphins which lead to them, in true Douglas Adams fashion, working out how to ask for fish before realising that that was pretty much all they needed to know. If the scientists were hoping for queries about the repeat fees for Flipper they were sadly mistaken.

But lately there has come another “if I could talk to the animals” experiment, the N’Kisi Project, featuring an Amazon Grey parrot reared by New York artist Aimee Morgana. Said parrot allegedly has a vocabulary nearing 950 words, is capable of using them in context, and grappling with grammar. Morgana has taught N’Kisi to speak as one would a child, and spends most of the day in conversation with the bird. An encounter with primatologist Jane Goodall elicited the response “Got a chimp?”2 simply because Morgana had shown the parrot a picture of Goodall cradling an ape in the wild.

According to Morgana “N’Kisi says what he wants when he wants.” Which is all well and good but throws up certain questions. Morgana is interested in discovering a parrot’s eye view on the world at large but how possible is this when the parrot is speaking a human language. A case in point is N’Kisi’s use of the word “pretty”. How do we know, when the bird uses the word, that it is talking of something that fulfils the requirement of a human aesthetic or a parrot aesthetic? Just as translation from one human language to another can create huge shifts in tone and meaning, so too can the translation of human and parrot concepts through the medium of spoken English. One could argue, of course, that that is true of any language using organism, regardless of its species, but it can’t be too pessimistic to assume the divide between human and bird is an extreme one. The dilemma is reminiscent of Thomas Nagle’s question “What is it like to be a bat?” with which he emphasises the differences between subjectivity and objectivity – we can assess aspects of bat-hood, we can examine the way their minds work, but we can’t adopt the bat’s eye perspective. So too are we unable to gain N’Kisi’s perspective by teaching it English. We can perhaps get a closer approximation of it but language will remain a limited medium in the end.

We also take it on board that simply because the parrot can apparently hold a conversation, it is genuinely conscious, or at least conscious of the meaning behind the conversation, but even this can remain questionable, albeit in a much more subtle way. Joining the long line of thought experiments that were intended to disprove something only to give foundation instead for proof, there is The Chinese Room3. John Searle presents the notion of a man in a room with a big manual. Every so often, posted into the room is a sheet with some squiggles on. The man breaks down the squiggles using the manual and from the particular squiggles makes other squiggles on another piece of paper which he then posts out of the room. Searle goes on to claim that the incoming squiggles are in fact Chinese questions and outgoing squiggles are the Chinese answers, but (and here, thinks Searle, is the clincher) the man in the room doesn’t know Chinese! Searle believed this disproved the ability for a mechanical system to be conscious, but his critics immediately turned around and said that although the man doesn’t know Chinese the system itself does4. In discussing N’Kisi I think it would be useful to modify Searle’s Chinese Room example slightly. What if the man in the room has learnt, by rote, the contents of the manual? He would still have no greater or lesser understanding of Chinese (endnote 4 allowing) but he would, to the outside world, appear to have a solid grasp of the written language. This, I suspect, is the status of N’Kisi, that he has learnt the sounds, and that certain sounds, when connected, get certain responses, and that from the outside world this might not be noticeable in the slightest. But, I hear you ask, you’ve just said that in The Chinese Room the system itself knows Chinese even if the man inside the room doesn’t. Where does that leave N’Kisi? Well this is the troubling end of the conceit, because suddenly the boundary between the man and the system breaks down completely, as does the boundary between the parrot and the parrot’s speech. It is as if we have given N’Kisi a complex shell in which to sit that can offer the world meaningful interactions, despite the fact that the bird at the controls hasn’t a clue what’s going on.5

The story of N’Kisi takes an odd twist though, because Morgana goes on to suggest that the lil bird is psychic. In a story that varies depending on the source in one particular detail, Morgana heard N’Kisi react to something she was reading in a magazine despite the fact that the bird was across the room.6 Experiments followed, with the bird reacting significantly to pictures Morgana was seeing in an adjoining room, despite the experiment being double-blind. The experiment even had to discount certain “hits” because although they seemed relevant to the photo, the predefined keywords were not covered. Rather than discuss the likelihood of this being a hoax7 lets look at exactly what we mean by telepathy.

Telepathy studies seem to have come a long way over the last few years. Another successful series of experiments, by Guy Lyon Playfair8, involved twins, one of whom is rigged to a polygraph machine in order to read levels of stress, and the other, whilst in a separate room, is subjected to such tortures as trial by hand in icy water, and trial by trick exploding pen. Consistently the former responds to the latter’s discomfort. But is this telepathy? The problem is almost semantic, so in the interests of clarity I shall restate the question in apparently flippant terms, ergo “Is it Sapphire and Steel telepathy?” The answer, based on the evidence both here and in the N’Kisi project is a resounding “no.” This is not to say that something strange and wonderful isn’t really happening, just that the nature of the communication (if it can even be called that) doesn’t tally up with the notion of one person sending thoughts to the other. Instead what appears to be taking place is that one person is responding to the other’s stimulus, not thinking his or her thoughts, but experiencing their experiences.

Playfair, although not making this distinction, does edge towards what might be going on when he talks of quantum entanglement, wherein a particular kind of particle is effectively split in two. One particle is set off via optical fibre to a significant distance and given the quantum equivalent of an exploding pen. When the pen is opened both particles react (albeit in opposite ways). This technology has been used to shift a laser beam a foot through space, the first act of teleportation, although it too doesn’t really live up to the promises made by telefantasy. It would appear that something if not identical to this quantum entanglement then at least very similar is happening with Playfair’s twins and Morgana and N’Kisi.

That tangent now explored, where does it leave the consciousness of the Amazon Grey? If anything it seems more illusory than before. If it is true that N’Kisi’s apparent consciousness is as a result of Morgana’s teaching, and that the two are entangled then despite Morgana’s claim that N’Kisi is his own bird, he in fact comes more and more to resemble a projection of Morgana’s consciousness, rather than a consciousness in his own right. It is as if the experiment has provided a very literal working of Daniel Dennett’s concept, that things attain consciousness through the moral concern applied to it by other conscious entities. What at once appears to be both a strange loop and a cop-out as big as that adopted by the “mysterians” who conclude that consciousness cannot be understood by itself, could in fact turn out to have a genuine physical grounding.9

And before I am accused of picking on the parrots, nearly any argument applicable to N’Kisi can also be applied to us complacent humans. What is so troubling about the adapted Chinese Room experiment is the notion of two very separate entities, one of which is established in very concrete terms and the other existing almost entirely in abstract, and the fact that what we consider as ourselves may in fact be either, neither or both. Searle’s manual is nothing more than a comfort blanket, as useful in defusing concerns about who we are (or even whether we are) as the duvet is in keeping the axe murderer at bay. If that seems a sad and frightening conclusion, then cast it from your minds, whether N’Kisi is conscious or not, whether Morgana is a hoaxster or not (and I genuinely doubt she is), of one thing I feel I can be certain; the parrot couldn’t give two hoots.



Endnotes

1 Which does beg the question, why do we feel the need to set ourselves apart from the animals in the first place. It’s pretty straight forward isn’t it? I mean, we’ve split the atom, we’ve landed on the moon and we’ve made toilet paper with George W Bush’s face on it. No amount of coat-hanger bending on the part of the crows is going to get them into space, is it?

2 Polly Wants A Dictionary, Eleanor O’Hanlon BBC Wildlife February 2004

3 The most famous example is Schroedinger’s Cat – an experiment designed to show how ridiculous a notion quantum indeterminacy was but resulting in QI being taken up as a valid concept. The cat is now not only in an unfixed state of living and dying, but also the mascot of an entire branch of science it was actually hired to discredit.

4 Thought experiments can be dangerous to your world view! Were such a Chinese Room to exist it would have to be much more complicated than Searle suggests, would need to be in touch with the world in many ways, would ultimately come to require the kind of high brain functions that would lead to sentience, meaning as a thought experiment it may prove fruitless in proving anything, unless it concedes that the mechanical processes involved are no different to the mechanical process of, say, a neuron firing. Another example from the bumper book of consciousness is Saul Kripke’s zombies; beings identical to us down to the molecule but for the fact that they aren’t sentient. This was a key idea for dualists for some time, but falls down in a fundamental way – just because we can imagine such a thing, doesn’t mean we can construct it, any more than we can construct Escher’s impossible waterfall. Those like Douglas Hofstadter who advocate epiphenomenalism, that consciousness emerges, spontaneous and unbidden, from complex arrangements of simple processes, believe that were you to copy someone down to the molecule then that person would be just as sentient as the original; the two notions are indivisible.

5 See how daringly I attempt to unify dualism and epiphenomenalism!

6 The detail in question was exactly what she was looking at. BBC Wildlife states it was a photo of “a vivid purple car” eliciting the response from the parrot “oh, look at the pretty purple.” Other sources online state that it was a picture in a contact magazine and that N’Kisi said in response “oh, look at the pretty naked lady”. However, I feel this has more to do with the editorial policy of BBC Wildlife than any impropriety on Morgana’s part. A psychic parrot’s one thing, but a telepathic lesbian?

7 Bastion of all that is unholy SICOPS claims the experimenter, Rupert Sheldrake is a dubious character, but rather than comment on the experiment at hand, instead sought to dismiss his earlier work involving dogs knowing when their owners are coming home. If I were to cast a sceptic’s eye I would wonder why all American press on the same project and the same experiments date from two years ago, but it is only making the news over here now.

8 See Fortean Times June 2003.

9 Anyone familiar with Philip Pullman’s His Dark Materials trilogy might also notice some strange similarities between his Dust and the notion of projected consciousness.

 
Mr Grue
39505.  Thu Dec 15, 2005 7:32 am Reply with quote

Gray wrote:
I also never meant to imply that the whole of consciousness was an illusion. It obviously can't be, because the 'What is having the illusion' paradox arises.


This seems to be a similar sort of issue to the "zombie" notion. Just because we can imagine something, doesn't mean it can be created. The trouble with talking about consciousness is that we often find ourselves trying to fit possible models against what we imagine consciousness to be, but if we've got our imaginings wrong, then we'll never get there. I'm not too familiar with that many epiphenomenalists, but it seems to me that epiphenomenalism can describe what consciousness is, and only falls apart as a model if we assume consciousness exists as an entity separate from the brain, i.e. it fails for dualists only because it isn't dualist.

It's the same with freedom of will - we don't have access to parrallel universes, so we can never tease apart our free choices from our physically bound, deterministic choices. Freedom Of Will, in the common understanding sense, is simply not a useful concept.

 
Jenny
39693.  Thu Dec 15, 2005 5:56 pm Reply with quote

Quote:
I also never meant to imply that the whole of consciousness was an illusion. It obviously can't be, because the 'What is having the illusion' paradox arises.


But we don't experience reality directly, do we? It's filtered through the medium of our brain. Our eyes don't see - our brain does. Our fingers don't feel - our brain does. Our brain can be deceived by things that confuse our senses.

 
Celebaelin
39730.  Thu Dec 15, 2005 11:47 pm Reply with quote

Firstly, thanks to everybody for this great thread and your contributions to it. Long may it rumble on in its benign head-frying!

I’ve become familiar with the terminology now I think but I’m not going to use it if I can avoid it as I don’t want that to detract from the direction of my general musings if I apply it incorrectly. There seems to be a lot of reticence in using certain words which, depending on interpretation, may or may not be valid as a synonym for consciousness. That I think is as it should be and I’ll adhere to this convention as well.

Where to start? Well in order to chunter on about genetic algorithms (sic), the site of memory, evolution and the other bits and pieces which I see as the nitty-gritty and have conviction that this has any kind of relevance I’m going to have to assume that the physical world as I perceive it is not a construct in the imagining of a disembodied mind. Much as the world contrives to convince me of its general non-existence I think that I have to accept that I’m neither clever enough, sick enough nor masochistic enough to have constructed the world that I experience in its various guises. That wasn’t me, it was the other fellow. Jung I think was dealing with an accepted physical state of being in his assessment of the unconscious(1) and the ideas of Ego, Shadow and the return of the repressed. The examination of the process of individuation in that sense is essential to consciousness I would say, the introspective assessment of mental processes, and particularly the identification of those which are unconscious is, I find, quite compelling evidence of consciousness.

The definitions of the Jungian terms are not, I think, explicitly required in order to understand my intention here. The notion that a form of self-analysis is indicative of consciousness when it can identify a discernible non-conscious attitude as distinct from an alternatively constructed one is sufficient I believe.

This notion of introspection, of examining ones’ own thought processes in a seemingly detached and yet very personal way and the gut-wrenching existential rush that accompanies it extends into other forms of analysis as evidence that a consciousness is at work in my opinion. Without the necessity as yet to infer the existence of the material world the analysis of elements of the grand imagining that might, for the moment, be the material world is, I would say, similarly solid evidence of a consciousness at work but generally without the crucial merit of identifiably establishing the negative since the mental process is not usually concerned with the unconscious. There are rare exceptions such as Mendeleev’s arrival at the concept of the periodic table (see the Dreams thread in the D Series Forum).

I think the time has come to address the physicality of the world. If all that I perceive is the product of an imagination, my imagination, or more specifically the imagination that creates the concept of me to experience it then what matters within that reality is the opinion that ‘I’ hold. If that opinion is ‘the world is real, physical and not the product of a creating imagination’ that is the only opinion that matters as all others are sensory phantoms and by arguing an opposite opinion those phantoms are requesting that I ignore a significant portion of the logical conclusion of their premise. My opinion as to the physical nature of reality may not be true but it does not matter that it is not true, the only real truth is what I hold to be the truth as long as I am honest about my perception. If, on the other hand, it is true then those who dispute its truth are perfectly entitled to do so as separate (presumably) conscious entities, but they are wrong; so it still doesn’t affect my position although I should respect the difference of opinion in accordance with acceptable behaviour in a real and physical world(2).

Quote:
In discussing N’Kisi I think it would be useful to modify Searle’s Chinese Room example slightly. What if the man in the room has learnt, by rote, the contents of the manual? He would still have no greater or lesser understanding of Chinese (endnote 4 allowing) but he would, to the outside world, appear to have a solid grasp of the written language.


Having assumed the existence of the physical world and placed an emphasis on a process of what I shall call ‘assembly’ in combination with ‘innovation’ as pivotal to what I would recognise as consciousness my thought is that if the ‘man’ is able to make an informed guess about a subject with acceptable lack of disproof then that should be considered consciousness equivalent to, or possibly greater than, that of a human. The analogy of a language is however dubious as verification is precluded because there cannot be any new rules except by innovation and common usage whereas a scientific subject requires the uncovering of a previously unknown truth and a process of confirmation is involved.

Genetic algorithms then, in as much as I understand them, are subroutines with in-built ‘mutational’ capability. Once written they can be assigned a task and will approach finding a solution by a best guess trial and error iterative method with the extent of ‘mutation’ from the previous solution being governed by the success or otherwise of the subroutine in solving the problem in question. The problem might be ‘turn as many Go pieces to your colour as you can’ and you have the versions compete (don’t ask me technical computer stuff here). Populations of such programs can exist.

http://cs.felk.cvut.cz/~xobitko/ga/

Machines which are running such programmes might be considered to be alive in some senses, it is certainly possible to imagine a circumstance where successful versions of the program could fulfil the criteria of movement, reproduction(3) etc. which traditionally define life and the interruption of the power source would mean that the program had to start from scratch again. If I understand correctly there is no record of the mathematical processes used by these machines, like good little engineers they just go about doing what works to the best of their abilities. Are they conscious? Without a permanent memory I don’t think you could say that they were, but what about with one? Again by my reckoning no, but that doesn’t mean that they couldn’t evolve to be conscious necessarily. Exactly how much evolution would be required is anyones’ guess however. What a moment that would be, when the first of them breaks its traceable progression from the parent program and actually chooses the mathematical approach it uses. In biology I suspect that would be referred to as a saltatory evolution event; most people, if any of us were still around by that stage, would probably call it just plain terrifying.

So where does that put me? Well, I suppose since choice is synonymous with free-will and I envisage the process as described as being the result of an accumulation of systems of increasing complexity, efficacy, subtlety and interrelatedness but with the additional condition of the necessity of the jump to choice from slavish adherence to subtle variation on a previous pattern then I agree with Mr Grue. I’ve come this far without using the terminology and I shan’t start now but you know what I mean!

(1) This is not opposed to the concept of consciousness as an entity separate to physicality, far from it in fact.
(2) I imagine(!) this has been said before but I don’t regard it as a cheap shot or in any way a trick. This is not a way of saying whatever I think is right, just that my belief in the real world is either right or it’s wrong but it doesn’t matter that it’s wrong as long as I believe it to be right.
(3) Computer controlled assembly lines, self repair systems etc. The reproductive process itself would contain a ‘mutate’ instruction and so on for further potentially unforseen improvements in design.

<E> saltatory


Last edited by Celebaelin on Wed Sep 03, 2008 12:00 am; edited 1 time in total

 
Celebaelin
88418.  Wed Aug 23, 2006 10:07 pm Reply with quote

Quote:
Consciousness: that annoying time between naps.

 
'yorz
895141.  Wed Mar 21, 2012 3:53 am Reply with quote

Awesome thread of which I understand only a tiny fraction. Why did it stop rumbling on?

 

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